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Abstract
This study investigates changes in the relationship between oil prices and the US economy 
from a long-term perspective. Although neither of the two series (oil price and GDP growth 
rates) presents structural breaks in mean, we identify different volatility periods in both of 
them, separately. From a multivariate perspective, we do not observe a signifi cant effect 
between changes in oil prices and GDP growth when considering the full period. However, 
we fi nd a signifi cant relationship in some subperiods by carrying out a rolling analysis and 
by investigating the presence of structural breaks in the multivariate framework. Finally, we 
obtain evidence, by means of a time-varying VAR, that the impact of the oil price shock on 
GDP growth has declined over time. We also observe that the negative effect is greater 
at the time of large oil price increases, supporting previous evidence of nonlinearity in the 
relationship.
Keywords: oil price, business cycle, structural breaks.
JEL classifi cation: C22, C32, E32, Q43.
Resumen
Este trabajo analiza los cambios en la relación entre el precio del petróleo y el PIB de Estados 
Unidos desde una perspectiva de largo plazo. Aunque en ninguna de las dos series (tasas 
de crecimiento del PIB y del precio del petróleo) se detectan cambios estructurales en la 
media, se identifi can diferentes períodos de volatilidad en cada una de ellas por separado. 
Adoptando un enfoque multivariante, no se observa un efecto signifi cativo entre los cambios 
en el precio del petróleo y el crecimiento del PIB cuando se considera el período completo. 
Sin embargo, a través de un análisis rolling y aplicando un test para la detección de cambios 
estructurales en un marco multivariante, se identifi ca una relación signifi cativa entre ambas 
variables en algunos subperíodos. Por último, se obtiene evidencia, por medio de un modelo 
VAR time-varying, de que el impacto de los shocks en el precio del petróleo sobre el 
crecimiento del PIB ha disminuido a lo largo del tiempo. Asimismo, se observa que el efecto 
negativo sobre el PIB es mayor cuando se producen fuertes incrementos en el precio del 
petróleo, lo que apoya la evidencia empírica previa de no linealidad en la relación entre 
ambas variables.
Palabras clave: precio del petróleo, ciclo económico, rupturas estructurales.
Códigos JEL: C22, C32, E32, Q43.
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1 Introduction
The literature on oil and macroeconomic variables is very extensive [see the sur-
veys of Hamilton (2008) and Kilian (2008)]. There is an ongoing debate on the
interaction between oil price and macroeconomic performance. However, analyses
of the link between oil price shocks and the business cycle have concentrated al-
most completely on relatively short horizons, from the early 1970s on. In particular,
two specific periods have received a great deal of attention: the 1970s in particular
and, to a lesser extent, the years since the beginning of the 21st century. It is well
recognized that this interest dates back to the 1970s because the 1970s (and also
the early 1980s) were characterized by serious oil price fluctuations together with
unfavorable oil supply shocks, considered as the reasons behind worldwide macroe-
conomic volatility and stagflation. The interest has been rekindled in more recent
times, given the possibility of a recurrence of this scenario. Indeed, some authors
have investigated the different effects between these two periods on the macroeco-
nomic variables [see Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007) and Gomez-Loscos et al. (2012)].1
Two notable exceptions to this relatively short-term perspective are Dvir and Ro-
goff (2009), who investigate the volatility and persistence patterns of oil price shocks
based on annual data for 1861-2008,2 and, more recently, Mohaddes and Pesaran
(2016), who analyze the effects of oil prices on output and real dividends using a
quarterly sample beginning in 1946.
The fact that the literature has focused on correctly identifying the source of
shocks on oil prices, almost exclusively during the post-1970s period, is related to the
frequent and tumultuous events in oil price markets at that time. It is also due to the
absence of high-frequency data from earlier periods. However, much can be learned
about the relationship between oil prices and macroeconomic conditions from the
less-recent past. We expect that over such a long period there have been important
changes in the demand and supply for oil that could lead to identify some structural
1Since the seminal work of Hamilton (1983) for the US economy, a growing number of articles
have analyzed the economic consequences of oil price shocks in industrialized countries. Most of the
literature shows that the effect of oil price on the economy was very important during the 1970s,
but has gradually disappeared since then (many studies support this view; Kilian (2008) provides
a comprehensive review of the literature). However, Go´mez-Loscos et al. (2011) and Gomez-Loscos
et al. (2012) show that this influence has revived, but with less intensity, since 2000 and, most
important, is manifested on inflation.
2The authors find that the real price of oil has historically tended to be both more persistent
and more volatile whenever rapid industrialization in the world economy coincided with uncertainty
regarding access to supply.
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breaks. For instance, prior to the mass production of automobiles, demand for
oil focused on kerosene lamps. Regarding oil supply, the relative importance of
Texas Railroad Commission and OPEC in setting world oil prices changed over this
period. In this study, we aim to investigate changes in the behavior of oil prices
and their influence on the US economy, using the longest available oil price series
(1861.1-2016.2), which allows us to offer an alternative view to the literature of the
historical role of the macroeconomic effects of oil.
The contributions of this study, which has some advantages over the previous
literature, are twofold. First, we use data with a broader coverage in the time
dimension than the previous studies (1861.1-2016.2 for oil prices and 1875.1-2016.2
for GDP). In particular, our study is the first one, as far as we know, that captures
the relationship between oil price shocks and the US GDP growth with such a long-
term perspective. Second, we provide a comprehensive methodological framework
to analyze the relationship between the two variables. We investigate the univariate
properties of the series, focusing on the presence of structural breaks and volatility.
Then, we adopt a multivariate perspective to delve into the relationship between
oil price shocks and GDP performance in order to identify structural breaks in the
multivariate regressions by employing three complementary tools: a VAR method, a
rolling estimation of causality and long-term impacts, and the Qu and Perron (2007)
methodology. Once the presence of instabilities in the series has been established,
we propose a time-varying GDP-oil price model to capture the relationship between
the two variables over time, detailing impulse responses during periods of intense
shocks in the oil price markets.
The main findings of the study are as follows. First, although neither of the
two series presents structural breaks in the mean, we identify in both of them,
separately, different volatility periods associated with major events either in the
economic performance of the US economy or in the oil markets. Second, delving deep
into the relationship between the two variables through the full period, we observe
that changes in oil prices have no significant effect on GDP growth. Nevertheless,
it is reasonable to think that, with so many significant events in such a long period,
both in business cycle dynamics and in the demand and supply factors of oil prices,
the relationship between the two variables may have not been so stable. This is
clear when we carry out a rolling analysis and investigate the presence of structural
breaks in the multivariate framework. In particular, we clearly identify four different
periods: 1875.2-1912.4, 1913.1-1941.1, 1941.2-1970.3, and 1970.4-2016.2. Third, we
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obtain evidence of a changing relationship over time regarding the time-varying
VAR: the impact of an oil price shock on GDP growth has declined over time. We
also observe that the negative effect is greater at the time of large oil price increases,
supporting previous evidence of nonlinearity in the relationship.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the
dataset used in the analysis. Section 3 investigates the univariate evolution of the
series, focusing on the presence of structural breaks in mean and volatility. Sec-
tion 4 analyzes the transmission of the effects between oil price shocks and GDP
growth, adopting a multivariate perspective. Section 5 proposes a time-varying VAR
model to capture different behaviors in the relationship over time. Finally, Section
6 concludes the study.
2 Data
We use series beginning in the nineteenth century and running until the present
for our analysis of oil prices and US GDP. Regarding the US GDP, we use real
quarterly data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), covering the period 1875.1 to 2016.2. In
particular, the BEA GDP series from 1947 onward is linked to a historical dataset
beginning in 1875, which is available at the NBER until 1983.3
The long crude oil price series in real terms is taken from the British Petroleum’s
Statistical Review of World Energy.4 This series has an annual frequency and links
three different price series: US average price (1861-1944), Arabian Light (1945-
1983), and Brent (1984-2015). Since our aim is to analyze the relationship between
oil price shocks and GDP, we adopt two strategies to be able to work with higher-
frequency data, which would allow us to better capture the effects of oil prices on
economic growth. First, we use the Chow-Lin interpolation technique [Chow and
Lin (1971)] to convert the annual series of oil prices into a quarterly series dataset,
using an intercept as high frequency indicator.5 Figure 1 displays both historical
3The first series is in real 2009 dollars, while the long historical series is in real 1972 dollars,
but has been transformed to link both. The historical series is taken from Appendix B of Gordon
(1986).
4British Petroleum (2016).
5Chow-Lin interpolation is a regression-based technique to transform low-frequency (annual,
in our case) data into higher-frequency (quarterly, in our case) data. In particular, we apply the
average version, which disaggregates the annual data into the means of four quarters and is the most
suitable approach for price data, and select the maximum likelihood method. We use the Matlab
toolbox of LeSage (1999) and Quilis (2004). This approach gives us the best fit when compared to
the available quarterly data. However, we have tested the accuracy of other disaggregation methods
and the results remain broadly unchanged.
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series. Second, in the last part of our sample, we work with real quarterly Brent data
from Datastream.6 We have considered three options to link this quarterly series
with the transformed annual data: (i) begin using the quarterly series in 1957, the
first year for which Brent data are available; (ii) delay the use of the quarterly
series until the 1970s, when data variability clearly increases; (iii) maintain the
first two consecutive series of the BP database and link with the quarterly series in
1984. Figure 2 illustrates the different options, and we observe hardly any difference
among the three (called oilp1, oilp2, and oilp3, respectively). To obtain more reliable
quarterly data, we chose the Brent quarterly series beginning in 1957 (oilp3).7 This
series is more accurate due to its higher frequency and is directly obtained from
Datastream. Thus, our final crude oil price time series consists of the quarterly
interpolated BP historical dataset until 1956, linked to the quarterly Brent data
from 1957 onward, and ranges from 1861.1 to 2016.2. Figure 3 displays the growth
rates of oil prices and GDP, calculated as the first logarithmic differences, which we
denote as ΔOILPt and ΔGDPt, respectively.
3 Univariate analysis of the series
In this section, as a first data exploratory analysis, we examine the univariate evo-
lution of each of the two series, oil prices and GDP growth rates. In particular, we
explore the possible existence of structural changes in both mean and variance of
the series.
3.1 Changes in mean
In this subsection, we test for the presence of structural breaks in the mean of
ΔGDP and ΔOILP. To this end, we apply the methodology of Bai and Perron
6Prices are in 2009 US dollars per barrel, and the US GDP deflator data are from the IMF.
7We have also considered other alternatives: (1) use the BP dataset, updating the last years
with the annual Brent series and transforming the whole sample into quarterly data through the
Chow-Lin procedure; (2) use the historical BP series linked to the West Texas Intermediate data
or the Producer Price Index for crude petroleum (since they are available or from 1984 onward)
instead of Brent prices. We have decided to disregard these options to obtain a more homogeneous
dataset by using Brent prices. However, comparing the path of the alternative series to the one
we use, we do not observe much difference. Furthermore, we repeated some calculations, obtaining
quite similar results.
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(1998, 2003a,b)(BP, henceforth).8 The BP methodology looks for multiple struc-
tural breaks, consistently determining the number of break points over all possible
partitions, as well as their location, and it is based on the principle of global min-
imizers of the sum of squared residuals. The methodology considers m possible
breaks (m+ 1 regimes) in a general linear model of the type:
yt = x
′
tβ + z
′
tδj + ut (1)
where the explanatory variables β and δj (j = 1, ...,m + 1) are the corresponding
vectors of the coefficients and Ti, ..., Tm are the break points, which are treated
endogenously in the model.
Using this method, Bai and Perron (1998) propose three types of tests. The first
one, called the supF (k) test, considers the null hypothesis of no breaks against the
alternative of k breaks. The second test, supF (l+ 1/l), considers the existence of l
breaks, with l = 0, 1, ..., as H0, against the alternative of l+1 changes. Finally, the
so-called double maximum tests UDmax and WDmax (the third type) test the null
of the absence of structural breaks against the existence of an unknown number of
breaks. The strategy suggested by Bai and Perron (2003a) consists of first beginning
with the sequential test supF (l+1/l). In case no break is detected, they recommend
checking this result with the UDmax and WDmax tests to determine whether at
least one break exists. When this is the case, they recommend continuing with
the sequential application of the supF (l + 1/l) test, with l = 1, ... In addition,
information criteria such as the traditional Bayesian information criterion (SBIC)
and the modified LiuWuSchwarz criterion (LWZ) are used to select the number of
changing points.
This strategy has been followed to explore the existence of structural breaks
in a model representing the mean of the variables, that is, a model with just a
constant: z′t = 1 and x′t = 0. The disturbance term is allowed to present both
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. A maximum number of five breaks has been
considered in accordance with a sample size of T = 565 for GDP growth and 621 for
oil price growth. Then, according to the length of the series, the selected trimming
is  = 0.15. A non-parametric correction has been employed to consider these
effects. Table 1 shows the results. According to the different tests, we cannot reject
8We have tested, but not rejected, the hypothesis that both series are I(0), using a battery
of standard unit root tests. The stationarity of the series is a pre-condition for applying the BP
method. Detailed results are available upon request.
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the hypothesis that neither ΔGDP nor ΔOILP presents structural changes in the
mean.9 For the whole period, the mean GDP growth is 0.80% and the mean oil
price growth, 0.19%.
3.2 Changes in volatility
To test for the possibility of structural breaks in the variance of the process, we
consider the Incla´n and Tiao (1994) (IT) test. This test, which has been extensively
used, allows for the detection of changes in the unconditional variance of a series
and belongs to the CUSUM-type family of tests. The test is defined as follows:
IT = supk
∣∣∣√T/2Dk∣∣∣ where
Dk =
Ck
Ct
− kt with Do = DT = 0
Ck =
∑k
t=1 u
2
t
(2)
This test assumes that the disturbance ut in equation yt = μ + ut, being
yt = ΔOILPt or ΔGDPt, is a zero-mean, normally i.i.d. random variable and
uses an iterated cumulative sum of squares (ICSS) procedure to detect the number
of breaks. However, Sanso et al. (2004) show that the asymptotic distribution of
the IT test is critically dependent on normality. Indeed, the IT test has large size
distortions when the Gaussian innovation assumption is not met in the fourth-order
moment, or for heteroskedastic conditional variance processes, and consequently
tends to overestimate the number of breaks.10 To overcome this drawback, they
propose a correction that explicitly takes into account both the fourth-order mo-
ment properties of the disturbances and the conditional heteroskedasticity (κ1 and
κ2, respectively).
9Alternatively, we tried a standard autoregressive model of order 1, with z′t = 1 and x
′
t = (yt−1),
finding similar conclusions. The results are also robust to considering a higher number of maximum
breaks. Gadea-Rivas et al. (2015) also confirm the absence of structural breaks in the mean of US
GDP series.
10Deng and Perron (2008) extend the IT approach to more general processes, showing that the
correction for non-normality proposed by Sanso et al. (2004) is suitable when the test is applied to
the unconditional variance of raw data. Furthermore, Zhou and Perron (2008) carry out a Monte
Carlo experiment that highlights the adequacy of this procedure when the mean or other coefficients
in the regression do not change; otherwise, the test has important size distortions, which increase
with the magnitude of change in the mean.
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IT (κ1) = supk
∣∣∣√T/Bk∣∣∣ where
Bk =
Ck− k
T
CT√
η̂
4
−σ̂4
η̂4 = T
−1∑Tt=1y4t , σ̂4 = T−1CT
(3)
IT (κ2) = supk
∣∣∣√T/Gk∣∣∣ where
Gk = ̂
−1/2
4 (Ck − kT CT )
(4)
where ̂4 is a consistent estimator of 4 = limT→∞E(T−1(
∑k
t=1(u
2
t − σ2))2).
The US GDP growth series is not mesokurtic (in fact, its excess kurtosis series is
3.15) and has a fat right tail. Moreover, the conditional variance of the innovations
is not constant over time.11 These properties are even more accentuated for oil
price growth series, in which excess kurtosis reaches 20.10 and shows very long
tails. Consequently, we use the previous corrections in addition to the original ICSS
algorithm.
Table 2 shows the results of the ICSS(IT ), ICSS(κ1), and ICSS(κ2) tests
applied to the US GDP and oil price growth rates. We observe overestimation
of break dates when using the original IT test (and even in the ICSS(κ1) test),
which is especially dramatic for oil price growth, considering the properties of this
series. Therefore, we focus on the results of the ICSS(κ2) test, which includes all
corrections. We find three breaks in the variance of GDP growth, chronologically
located in 1917.4, 1946.2, and 1984.1, confirming the findings of Gadea-Rivas et al.
(2015).12 These break dates approximately match the end of each of the world wars
and the beginning of the Great Moderation. Thus, a secular reduction in volatility
is observed in US GDP growth.
The results of the variance tests applied to the oil price growth rate show only
two changes in variance, in 1878.4 and 1973.4. Indeed, oil prices are more volatile in
the beginning and ending periods (the last period being significantly more volatile),
while a much less volatile period is observed from 1878 to 1973 (see Figure 3). Dvir
and Rogoff (2009) relate these break points to a combination of technological and
11Fagiolo et al. (2008) find that the US GDP growth rates can be approximated by leptokurtic
densities. This indicates that output growth changes tend to be quite uneven in the sense that
large positive or negative changes seem to be more frequent than a Gaussian model would predict.
12The authors offer a thorough analysis of the sources and features of these different volatility
periods.
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geographic factors affecting the oil market,13 along with a booming demand for oil,
over oil transportation to end. However, US control over excess exploitable reserves ended and
OPEC dominance increased in 1969.
14See also Hamilton (2011) for a historical survey of the oil industry with particular focus on the
events related to significant oil price changes.
15Zhou and Perron (2008) show that, in case changes in the mean of the series are not taken into
account, the test suffers from severe size distortions. However, we have shown that our series do
not have structural breaks in the mean. This method has been used in several studies: Herrera and
Pesavento (2005), Stock and Watson (2002), and Gadea et al. (2014), among others.
16Notice that these break points are the least significant ones with both approaches. Indeed, the
break of 1929.3 is not even identified with Model 2 of the BP methodology.
13Construction of the first long-distance pipeline began in 1878, allowing the railroad monopoly
driven by the large-scale industrialization of the US and East Asia.14
To provide robustness to the previous results, we use an additional test within
the parametric framework, which consists in applying the BP test to the mean
of the absolute value of the estimated residuals
√
π
2 |t| from one of the following
specifications:15
Model 1: yt = μ+ t
Model 2: yt = μ+ ρyt−1 + t
t = z
′
tδj + ut
z′t = 1
(5)
where yt represents ΔOILPt or ΔGDPt.
Table 3 roughly confirms the ICSS(κ2) test results. We focus on the results
of model 1. Regarding the identification of structural breaks in the GDP growth
rate, we identify three break points as in the previous exercise. However, the dates
differ, as a structural break in 1929.3 coincides with the 1929 Crash as against the
one related to the end of the first world war.16 Concerning the oil prices, we find
three break points instead of two. The new break point is located in 1935.2, while
the other two are the same previously identified. Dvir and Rogoff (2009) apply this
methodology to the annual series of oil prices finding roughly the same three break
points. They link the new break to both a major oil discovery a few years earlier
(the East Texas oil Field) and a worldwide recession.
4 Multivariate analysis of the series
After studying the univariate evolution of both oil price and GDP growth rates, this
section analyzes the transmission of the effects between them and their direction.
To this end, we first use a standard VAR methodology and, subsequently, consider
different methodologies to take into account the possible instability of the VAR pa-
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rameters. In particular, we compute a rolling causality test and cumulative impulse
response functions. In addition, we analyze the presence of structural breaks in our
VAR equation.
4.1 VAR estimation
A simple way to analyze the dynamic relationship between oil price variations and
GDP growth is the use of a standard VAR(p) model. Following Sims (1980) and
Lu¨tkepohl (2005), among many others, we define this model as follows:
Yt = μ+
p∑
i=1
ΨiYt−1 + εt, t = 1, 2, ..., T (6)
where Yt = (ΔGDPt,ΔOILPt)
′ is a 2x1 vector composed of observations of
the variables, Ψi (i = 1, ..., p) are 2x2 coefficient matrices, εt = (ε1t, ε2t)
′ with
εit, (i = 1, 2) is an unobservable zero mean white noise vector of dimension T , and p
is the parameter that determines the VAR dimension, chosen according to the SBIC
criterion.17 The model is specified as follows:[
ΔOILPt
ΔGDPt
]
=
[
ψ11 ψ12
ψ21 ψ22
][
ΔOILPt−1
ΔGDPt−1
]
+
[
ε1t
ε2t
]
(7)
The VAR estimation is reported in Table 4. The results show no significant
effect of oil price growth on GDP growth, which means ΔOILP does not influence
– that is, does not Granger-cause – GDP growth. We obtain a similar result in the
opposite direction, as the effect of GDP growth on oil price growth is not significant.
Furthermore, the parameter ψ12 is negative and ψ21 is positive. This means that
the effect of oil price growth on output growth is negative, while the effect of GDP
growth on oil price is positive. Although these findings are quite suggestive and
support our intuition about the causal effects between GDP and oil prices, we test
them more formally.
The previous framework allows us to test for causality direction. Following
Granger (1969), a variable (or group of variables), z1, is found to help predict another
variable (or group of variables), z2. Then, z1 is said to Granger-cause z2. We can
17The SBIC criterion selects one lag. Nevertheless, other information criteria, such as the Akaike
information criterion (AIC) and the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) criterion select five lags. Therefore, we
use a VAR(1) as the preferred model and estimate, additionally, a VAR(5) to check the robustness of
our results. For simplicity, and to save space, we only present the results for the VAR(1) and discuss
whether some interesting results or significant differences appear with respect to the VAR(5).
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test this hypothesis by simply studying whether the Ψ matrices are triangular, which
is a remarkably visual test for a VAR(1). Additionally, a more formal Wald test is
computed, where the null hypothesis is that z1 does not cause z2. More specifically,
z1 does not lead to z2 if E(z2t|z2t−1, z2t−2, ...; z1t−1, z1t−2, ...) = E(z2t|z2t−1, z2t−2, ...).
18 The results of the Granger causality analysis are presented in the last rows of
Table 5, confirming the previous findings.19
We also employ impulse-response functions (IRFs) to capture the dynamics of
the shocks. To obtain IRFs, we use a moving average representation of the VAR
system, which is defined in the following expression:
Yt =
[
μ1
μ2
]
+
∞∑
s=0
[
ψ11 ψ12
ψ21 ψ22
]s [
ε1t−s
ε2t−s
]
(8)
or in matrix notation and in terms of the innovations of the structural model: Yt =
μ+
∞∑
s=0
Φ(s)εt−s
The coefficients of the succession of matrices Φ(s) represent the impact that a
shock in the structural innovation has on the variables of the VAR system over time.
Results of IRF computations with a horizon of 5 years (20 quarters) are displayed
in Figure 4, where confidence intervals at 90% are computed according to Kilian’s
(1998) bootstrap-after-bootstrap method. We conclude that the effects, which are
negative for the response of ΔGDP to an impulse of ΔOILP and positive for the
response of ΔOILP to an impulse of ΔGDP , last between 7-8 quarters and are not
significant at any length. We also observe a high degree of uncertainty during the
time of non-zero IRFs.20
In addition, we compute cumulative impulse-response functions (CIR), defined
as CIR =
∞∑
h=0
IRF (h), which allow us to identify the same effects in the long run.
Thus, considering the full period (1875.2-2016.2), ΔOILP has a negative effect (-
0.0057) on ΔGDP , while ΔGDP has a positive effect (0.3306) on ΔOILP , although
neither is significant.21
18We have repeated the analysis with annual data as a robustness check, finding qualitatively the
same results.
19An estimation of a VAR system with five lags does not change this conclusion.
20As is well-known, the order of variables is relevant for IRF computation, as the Cholesky
decomposition requires triangulation. To test the robustness of the results, we have redone all
calculations with the system in the inverse order: Yt = (ΔOILPt,ΔGDPt)
′ and have also calculated
the generalized IRF. The findings are the same, which is not surprising, given the results of casualty.
21The confidence intervals are (-0.0269, 0.0151) and 0.3306 (-0.4279, 1.1086), respectively. They
were computed with the same bootstrap methodology as for the IRFs.
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Summing up, we do not observe any significant effect between changes in oil
prices and GDP growth when considering the full period. Nevertheless, it is reason-
able to think that in such a long period in which significant events have occurred,
both in the business cycle dynamics and in the demand and supply factors of oil
prices, the relationship between the two variables may have not been so stable. In
fact, our findings in the previous section already show several structural breaks in
volatility that correspond to important changes in the characteristics of the busi-
ness cycle and different periods in the evolution of oil prices. The hypothesis of a
changing relationship is explored in the following subsections.
4.2 Rolling sample analysis
The previous section provides some insights about the direction of the relationship
between oil inflation and the US GDP growth. However, it is possible that this
relationship has been modified across time, as suggested by Gomez-Loscos et al.
(2012). Thus, it is advisable to estimate the model for different subsamples in order
to verify whether the parameters change. In this regard, we adopt two alternative
strategies: (i) compute causality test and (ii) calculate CIRs, as a measure of long-
run impacts, instead of using short-run parameters. We consider a rolling estimation
with a window of 40 quarters in both cases.
Regarding the causality test, results are displayed in Figure 5, which plots a heat
map of p-values of the Granger causality test. Different colors represent the different
significance levels at which we can reject or accept the Granger causality test. Values
in yellow and dark blue mean that we can reject the null hypothesis of non-causality,
whereas values in no colour indicate no causality between the variables. In general,
we scarcely observe periods of significant causality, given the overwhelming presence
of no color in the figure. Focusing on causality from ΔOILP to ΔGDP (left-hand
side of the figure) and with a liberal threshold of the 0.10 significance level, we
identify two stable and long periods where oil prices clearly influence GDP growth:
1879.1-1894.4 and 1981.1-1999.2. In the rest of the period, we only find isolated
dates during mid-20th century (the 1950s) and at the beginning of the period,
before 1879.4. Results basically hold when considering a tighter significance level
of 5%, although the instability during the 1980s and 1990s increases. To sum up,
the influence of oil price growth on GDP growth is significant only for 14% of the
sample at the 10% significance level.
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As for the opposite direction of causality, from ΔGDP to ΔOILP (right-hand
side of the figure), the proportion of the sample where the influence is significant
is similar at 10% level but reduces to 9% at the 5% significance level. Periods
of causality from GDP growth to oil price variations are found in 1911.2-1923.4,
1953.2-1971.2, and 1988.2-2000.2.22 We conclude that the relationship between the
two variables is relatively weak in the long run. However, at shorter horizons, the
major intensity in the bidirectional relationship is located in the 1980s and 1990s.
With respect to CIRs, Figure 6 displays the results of impulses from ΔGDP to
ΔOILP (upper panel) and from ΔOILP to ΔGDP (lower panel). Focusing on the
rolling estimation of CIRs between the two variables, we observe that the estimated
response to an impulse from ΔGDP to ΔOILP remains close to zero, and non-
significant, over the whole sample, except for the estimated impulse response over the
periods 1961-7123 and 1937-46.24 The estimated impulse from ΔOILP to ΔGDP
presents higher variability. Indeed, from the mid-1960s to the end of the century, it
is positive most of the time. The effect turns negative during the noughties of the
21st century. Nonetheless, the confidence intervals show no significant effect in the
short periods, also identified in the upper panel of the figure.25
4.3 Structural breaks in the relationship between oil prices and
GDP
The univariate analysis of the series offers some evidence of structural breaks in
the volatility of the two series. Additionally, the rolling results of the previous
subsection are not conclusive about the hypothesis of parameter stability. Thus,
it seems to be appropriate to consider the existence of structural breaks in our
multivariate specification. To that end, the Qu and Perron (2007) (QP, henceforth)
22Since 2005, the causality test is near the 10% threshold limit of significance. This result agrees
with that of Gadea and Gomez-Loscos (2014), who document a positive and significant effect of
GDP growth on oil prices since the 2000s.
23This was an extraordinary growth period in the US economy. The increasing demand for oil
caused oil price increases.
24During this period, the US economy had to face World War II with devastating economic
consequences (the first postwar US recession began at the end of 1948). The demand for petroleum
products caused a sharp increase in the price of oil and although the US increased oil production
enormously during World War II, there were shortages in several plants.
25We have repeated the analysis using annual data, reaching the same conclusions.
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approach provides a valid technique to find structural breaks,26 as it allows for
multiple structural changes that occur at unknown dates in a general system of
equations, which indeed include the one defined in (10).
Following these authors, we assume that we have n equations and T observations,
the vector Yt includes our two endogenous variables (ΔGDP and ΔOILP ), the
parameter q is the number of regressors, and zt is a set that includes the regressors
from all the equations. The selection matrix S is of dimension np × q with full
column rank, where q is the total number of parameters. It involves elements that
take the values 0 and 1, indicating which regressors appear in each equation. The
total number of structural changes in the system is m, and the break dates are
denoted by the m vector T = (T1; ...;Tm), considering that T0 = 1 and Tm+1 = T ,
with j indexing the regime (j = 1, ...,m + 1). Then, the model proposed takes the
following form:
Yt =
(
I ⊗ z′t
)
Sβj + ut (9)
with ut having mean 0 and covariance matrix
∑
j for Tj−1+1 ≤ t ≤ Tj . In our present
case, we should note that zt = (1,ΔGDPt−1, ...,ΔGDPt−p,ΔOILPt−1, ...,ΔOILPt−p),
and S = I2q, where q = 2 + p(2 + 1) and p is the selected number of lags. Again,
the number of lags has been chosen by taking into account the SBIC.
To determine the number of breaks in the system, we first use the UDmaxLRT (M)
statistics to test whether at least one break is present. When the tests reject it, the
test Seqt(l + 1|l) is sequentially applied for l = 1, 2 . . .m until it fails to reject the
null hypothesis of no additional structural break. Additionally, we compute the
SupLR) to test l = 1, 2 . . . ,m versus l = 0.
According to the critical values derived from the response surface regressions, the
tests offer evidence of three breaks (m = 3) in the system of equations, which satisfies
the minimal length requirement, notice that because of our sample size (T = 562),
we have carried out the procedure with a trimming parameter of 0.2. Results of
the application of this procedure are reported in Table 5. The three break dates
are located in 1912.4, 1941.1, and 1970.3. Notice that the first two breaks are quite
close to those identified in the univariate analysis of structural breaks in volatility
of the GDP growth, while the third break is near the last structural volatility break
26This methodology has been used to test the effects of oil price shocks on GDP growth and
CPI inflation for the G7 countries in Gomez-Loscos et al. (2012) and for the Spanish economy in
Go´mez-Loscos et al. (2011).
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in oil prices. Hence, we identify four different periods in the relationship between
oil price shocks and the US GDP growth.27 For each of the four periods, we repeat
the analysis presented in subsection 4.1. The number of lags for each period has
been selected according to different information criteria (they appear in brackets in
Table 5).
The first interval covers the period between 1875.1 and 1912.4. Thus, the im-
minent beginning of World War I (WWI, henceforth) marks the end of this period.
The sample begins just after the panic of 1873, when the US was still facing its
economic consequences. A few years later, the US economy had to cope with the
aftermath of the 1893 panic, while already in the 20th century, the US economy
faced WWI (1914-1918). Regarding oil prices, this period is characterized by the
evolution of the oil industry along with the exhaustion in production of key oil fields,
at a time in which the demand was strong.
The second period starts in 1913.1 and ends in the early 1940s. During that time,
the US economy was affected by some of the most influential economic events of the
20th century, such as the Crash of 1929, with devastating economic effects during
the next decade, and WWII (1939-1945). Concerning the historical oil price shocks,
this period was much influenced by the Great Depression, with an associated decline
in oil demand, and the introduction of state regulation of industry and restrictions
on competition. No Granger causality is identified from any of the two variables to
the other in either of the first two subperiods.
The third period runs from 1941.2 to 1970.3. In terms of the US economy dy-
namics, this period is characterized by a post-war economic boom that lasted until
the 1970s. Indeed, during the 1950s, and especially the 1960s, the US experienced
its longest, almost uninterrupted period of economic expansion in history. Oil prices
were quite stable during this period. OPEC was established in 1960 with five found-
ing members. Throughout the post-WWII period, exporting countries experienced
an increasing demand for oil, and the volume of oil that Texas producers could pro-
duce was no longer limited, but the power to control crude oil prices shifted from
the US to OPEC. During this period of economic boom, ΔGDP has a significant
effect on ΔOILP .
Finally, the last period begins in the early 1970s and ends in 2016.2. The 1970s
were characterized by the end of the Bretton Woods system and substantial oil
27For a detailed analysis of the dynamics of US GDP growth over these periods, see Gadea-Rivas
et al. (2015). For the case of oil price evolution, see Hamilton (2011) and Dvir and Rogoff (2009).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1625
price shocks, economic growth became stagnant, and inflation grew. In the 1980s,
these disequilibria were reversed, and the US economy witnessed a reduction in the
volatility of the business cycle. The last period of the sample (from 1984 on) is
called the Great Moderation. During this period, the US enjoyed long economic
expansions, interrupted only by three recessions, the last one being the Great Re-
cession (2007-2009), which was followed by a weak recovery. The evolution of oil
prices during this period and its effect on macroeconomic performance have been
extensively studied in the literature. The US, as did most industrialized economies,
became heavily dependent on imported crude oil from the Middle East, and the
1970s were a tumultuous decade in terms of oil market events.28 Other political
events that influenced oil prices took place during the rest of the period.29 During
this final period, the effect of ΔOILP on ΔGDP is significant at 10%.
To sum up, the Granger causality between the two variables is significant only
in two periods. ΔGDP has a significant effect on ΔOILP , on the one hand, in the
1941.2-1970.3 sample, when the US economy experienced a huge economic boom,
and, on the other, in the 1970.3-2016.2 sample (in the opposite causality direction),
when oil price shocks exerted a significant influence on economic performance.
Figures 7-10 display IRFs in different regimes delimited by structural breaks. We
observe that ΔOILP has a negative effect on ΔGDP in all periods except 1941.2-
1970.3. Regarding the effect of the ΔGDP shock on ΔOILP , the sign changes,
highlighting the positive influence in the last period. Nevertheless, these effect are
non significant for the most part of all sub-periods.
5 A time-varying GDP-oil price model
In previous sections, we find ample evidence of instability and non-linearities in the
relationship between real GDP growth and oil price shocks. In this section, we use
a more subtle and sophisticated econometric tool, a time-varying structural VAR
28The Arab-Israel war in 1973, which followed the long-lasting Arab-Israeli conflict, and the
Iranian revolution in 1978-1979 are a few examples.
29Such as the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, the Venezuelan crisis
of 2002, the Iraq War of 2003, or the Libyan uprising of 2011.
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Primiceri (2005), we consider the model
Yt = μt +
p∑
i=1
Ψi,tYt−1 + εt, t = 1, 2, ..., T (10)
where μt is a 2x1 vector of time-varying coefficients for the constant term; Ψi,t is a
2x2 matrix of time-varying coefficients, and εt contains heteroskedastic unobservable
shocks with the variance-covariance matrix Σt. After a triangular reduction of Σt,
we obtain the following model:
yt = In ⊗ [1, y′t−1, ..., y′t−p]Ψt +Φ−1t Σtut
ΦtΩtΦ
′
t = ΣtΣ
′
t
(11)
where Φt is a lower triangular matrix and Σt is a diagonal matrix.
The time-variant nature of the VAR model derives both from the coefficients
and the variance-covariance matrix of the innovations. Its estimation is based on a
Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm with a Bayesian approach.30
The identification conditions of the model allow us to capture oil price shocks
affecting GDP growth, but these shocks are exogenous to GDP growth, as well as
the reaction of oil prices to GDP growth evolution. Thus, we focus on exogenous oil
price shocks, which can be isolated in the time-varying system and are more relevant
considering the previous analysis. Figure 11 presents the posterior mean of the
time-varying standard deviation of oil price shocks. The post-1970s period exhibits
a substantially higher variance of oil price shocks than other periods. Although
not our primary concern, the time-varying standard deviation of GDP growth, too,
reveals interesting results. We can observe a secular decline in volatility and identify
several periods delimited by WWII and the Great Moderation.31
More interestingly, the time-varying VAR approach allows us to calculate IRFs
at different points of time and assess different responses. The dates are not arbi-
trary, but capture major shocks behind the largest movements in oil price markets,
which could have exerted an influence on the economic conditions regarding the
relationship between oil prices and GDP growth in those dates. In particular, we
select the oil price downturns of 2014.4, 2008.4, 1986.1, 1991.1, and 2008.3, ordered
from the highest to the lowest decline (-91.1%, -65.1%, -51.4%, -48.0%, and -39.6%,
30For technical details, see Primiceri (2005). An adaptation of its Matlab code has been used to
compute the estimates.
31These results confirm those obtained by Gadea-Rivas et al. (2015).
model, to further explore the relationship between the two variables. Following
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respectively), and the increases that took place in 1974.1, 1990.3, 1979.2, 2009.2,
and 1999.1, from the highest to the lowest value (118.2%, 89.5%, 41.5%, 36.6%, and
35.1%, respectively). They are displayed in Figure 12. In the following paragraphs,
we describe the events affecting world oil markets during these dates in chronological
order.
The Arab oil-exporting nations’ embargo of 1973 against countries (in particular,
the US and many other developed countries) supporting Israel in the Yom Kippur
War, at a time of rising demand and decreasing OPEC production, caused oil prices
to abruptly increase. Specifically, by the first quarter of 1974, the increase reached
118.2%.
From 1974 to 1978, crude oil prices were relatively flat, but the crises in Iran
and Iraq in 1979 and 1980 led to a new round of increases. Indeed, the Iranian
revolution was the cause of one of the highest oil price rises, in spite of its relatively
short duration. In the second quarter of 1979, the oil price jump was 41.5%.
In 1986, there was a collapse in crude oil prices, which was due to the fact that
the OPEC cut output significantly to defend its official price in response to declining
world oil demand and increasing production in non-OPEC countries. In the first
quarter of the year, the decrease in oil prices reached 65.1%.
The Persian Gulf War also affected world oil markets. The Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in 1990 caused a rapid oil price escalation. Indeed, in the third quarter of
1990, oil prices rose by 89.5%. However, after two months of oil price increases, the
United Nations approved the use of force against Iraq and oil prices began falling.
In the first quarter of 1991, oil prices diminished by 48%.
In early 1999, oil prices began to grow, after the downward trend during the
previous year, caused by a decline in consumption in Asian economies and higher
OPEC production. This rise in oil prices was due to the reduction of OPEC pro-
duction. This organization decided to cut production by about three million barrels
per day, and the increase in oil prices in the first quarter of 1999 was 35.1%.
In 2008, after the Great Recession began,32 falling petroleum demand, at a time
when speculation in the crude oil futures market was exceptionally strong, decreased
oil prices. In the third quarter of 2008, this decrease was 39.6%, while in the fourth
quarter, the decline deepened to 91.1%. Nevertheless, an OPEC production cut
32The Great Recession has been the worst recession in the US economy since the Great Modera-
tion. For an analysis of the Great Moderation in the face of the Great Recession, see Gadea et al.
(2014).
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in early 2009, some tensions in the Gaza Strip, and a rising demand from Asian
countries increased oil prices steadily. In the second quarter of 2009, oil prices
peaked at 36.6%.
The oil price decline in 2014 came after a period of stability. This drop was due
to several factors. There was a slowdown in global economic activity. Indeed, the
same countries that pushed up the price of oil in 2008 helped bring oil prices down in
2014. The US and Canada increased their production of oil, cutting their oil imports
sharply, which put further downward pressure on world prices. Furthermore, Saudi
Arabia decided to keep its production stable in order not to sacrifice their market
share and restore the price. The oil price decline in the fourth quarter of 2014 was
-91.1%.33
Results of impulse-response analysis over time are displayed in Figures 13 and
14. It should be noted that at selected dates (either increases or decreases), we
introduce a normalized shock in the model (always positive) to see to what extent
the conditions of the economy could have changed over time. Oil price growth shocks
have temporary effects on GDP growth. At the time of large oil price increases, we
observe a GDP decline over the first three quarters, while at the time of large oil
price decreases, the effect on GDP is not so clear. However, confidence intervals are
quite large during the first two years and a half. Figures 15 and 16 compare the
magnitude of GDP growth changes in different periods. We observe that all the oil
price increase dates considered have a similar negative effect on GDP growth, except
the one in 2009.2. We find the same pattern for the effect of oil price decreases.
The impact of an oil price shock on GDP growth has declined over time, although
there is more dispersion among different episodes in this case. Overall, oil price
elasticity with respect to GDP has declined.34 Finally, Figure 17 compares the
average effects at the time of large oil price increases and decreases. We observe
that the negative effect of oil price shocks on GDP growth is greater at the time
of large oil price increases, which confirms previous evidence of nonlinearity in the
relationship [Hamilton (2003)].
33See Baumeister and Kilian (2016) for a thorough analysis of this episode.
34These results would be in line with Blanchard and Gal´ı (2007), who find a changing relationship
over time, such that the economy is more resilient to an oil price shock today than in the past.
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6 Conclusions
This study analyzes the relationship between oil prices and GDP from a long-term
perspective, from the last third of the 19th century, when crude oil started to be
commercially produced in Pennsylvania, to the present. Using different econometric
tools, we analyze the individual dynamics of the series, as well as their interaction.
The univariate study of the series shows that none of them presents structural breaks
in mean. However, this apparent tranquility hides a considerable, and divergent,
volatility. While real GDP growth has evolved into a secular volatility reduction,
the variability of oil prices has substantially changed over the sample period.
Considering the whole sample, the evidence of the influence between GDP and
oil prices is extremely weak, and not statistically significant, which could be due
to the fact that there are instabilities in the relationship masking it. Indeed, over
such a long period there have been important changes in the demand and supply
for oil that could lead to identify some structural breaks. Therefore, we use several
econometric techniques to detect and isolate different episodes, finding three break
dates which are located in 1912, 1941, and 1970. Only this last period has been
thoroughly studied in the literature.
We find that the period of the strongest relationship, characterized by a negative
effect of oil price increases on GDP growth, occurs after the 1970s. However, in this
last period, a time-varying model shows a decline in the impact of oil price shocks
on GDP growth since then. Furthermore, we identify an asymmetric effect between
large oil price increases and decreases. We notice that the negative effect of oil price
shocks on GDP growth is greater at the time of large oil price increases. We also
observe that the response of GDP to oil is significant over the periods 1961-71 and
1937-46.
Overall, the story of the relationship between GDP and oil prices is relatively
turbulent. Although our findings point to a negative influence from oil price increases
on economic growth, this phenomenon is far from being stable and has gone through
different phases over time. Further research is necessary to fathom this complex
relationship.
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Tables
Table 1: Multiple structural breaks in mean (Bai-Perron methodology)
ΔGDP ΔPOIL
supF(k)
k=1 1.80 0.38
k=2 1.70 0.94
k=3 2.20 1.71
k=4 2.08 1.32
k=5 1.43 0.70
supF(l+1/l)
l=0 1.80 0.38
l=1 2.44 1.54
l=2 2.77 0.58
l=3 1.58 0.82
l=4 − −
UDmax 2.20 1.71
WDmax 3.56 2.46
T(SBIC) 0 0
T(LWZ) 0 0
T(sequential) 0 0
Notes: Changes are tested by selecting a trimming of  = 0.15. and a maximum
number of five breaks. Serial correlation and heterogeneity in the errors are allowed.
The consistent covariance matrix is constructed using the Andrews (1991) method.
Critical values in Bai and Perron (1998).
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Table 2: Multiple structural breaks in variance (ICSS methodology)
ΔGDP ΔOILP
ICSS(IT)
1917.4 1878.4
1946.2 1914.2
1984.2 1921.3
2007.4 1930.3
2009.2 1934.2
1936.3
1944.4
1947.3
1960.4
1970.4
ICSS(κ1)
1929.3 1862.1
1934.3 1963.1
1946.2 1878.4
1984.1 1930.3
1934.2
1973.4
ICSS(κ2)
1917.4 1878.4
1946.2 1973.4
1984.1
Note: Dates of the detected changes in variance. ICSS(i), i = {IT, κ1, κ2}.
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Table 3: Multiple structural breaks in variance (Bai-Perron methodology)
ΔGDP ΔPOIL
Model 1
1929.3 1878.4
1947.1 1935.2
1984.2 1973.4
Model 2
1946.3 1973.3
1983.4
Notes: The BP method is applied on the corrected square residuals of yt = μ + t,
Model 1 or yt = μ + ρyt−1 + t, Model 2. Changes in the mean are tested selecting
a trimming of  = 0.15. and a maximum number of 10 breaks. Serial correlation
and heterogeneity in the errors are allowed. The consistent covariance matrix is
constructed using the Andrews (1991) method. Critical values in Bai and Perron
(1998).
Table 4: Estimation of the VAR system
Coeff. p− value
Dependent variable: ΔGDP
Intercept 0.486 0.000
ΔGDP 0.392 0.000
ΔOILP -0.003 0.649
Dependent variable: ΔOILP
Intercept -0.049 0.932
ΔGDP 0.175 0.478
ΔOILP 0.132 0.002
Granger causality
ΔOILP→ ΔGDP 0.207 0.649
ΔGDP→ ΔPOIL 0.504 0.478
Note: The null hypothesis for the Granger causality test
is that ΔOILP does not cause ΔGDP or viceversa.
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Table 5: Structural breaks in the VAR system (QP methodology)
WDmax SupLR Seq(l + 1/l) TBi
0 vs 1 0 vs 2 0 vs 3 l = 1 l = 2
979.130a 979.130a 1104.231a 1159.779a 156.685a 64.157a 1912.4, 1941.1, 1970.3
Granger-Wald causality test
1875.2-1912.4 (6) 1913.1-1941.1 (6) 1941.2-1970.3 (5) 1970.4-2016.2 (5)
ΔOILP→ ΔGDP 0.481 0.339 0.400 0.100
ΔGDP→ ΔOILP 0.251 0.272 0.000 0.497
Notes: a means values significant at 1% level. TBi denotes the date of a structural break.
The null hypothesis for the Granger causality test is that ΔOILP does not cause ΔGDP or vice versa. We show p-values
for the Granger causality test. For each subperiod, we present in brackets the number of lags selected according to several
information criteria.
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Figure 1: Historical oil prices
Notes: The top figure represents the annual BP oil price series, which are made of three different series: US average price (1861-1944), Arabian
Light (1945-1983), and Brent (1984-2015). The bottom figure displays the same series converted to a quarterly frequency through the Chow-Lin
interpolation technique.
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Figure 2: Oil prices and GDP
Notes: The top figure represents the US real quarterly GDP obtained from the BEA and the NBER (1875.1-2016.2). The bottom figure shows
three different real quarterly oil price series: “oilp1” links the BP real quarterly series (transformed using the Chow-Lin technique) with Brent
quarterly data from 1957 on; “oilp2” is composed of the BP real quarterly series (transformed using the Chow-Lin technique) and Brent quarterly
data from 1970 on; “oilp3” puts together the BP real quarterly series (transformed using the Chow-Lin technique) and Brent quarterly series
from 1984 on.
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Figure 3: Oil prices and GDP growth rates
Notes: The top figure represents the growth rate of the US real quarterly GDP obtained from the BEA and the NBER (1875.1-2016.2). The
bottom figure displays the growth rate of “oilp3,” which consists of the quarterly interpolated BP historical dataset until 1956 linked to the
quarterly Brent data from 1957 onward and ranges from 1861.1 to 2016.2.
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level have been computed according to Kilian (1998).
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions of a VAR(1) for GDP and oil price growth rates
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Figure 5: Rolling estimation of causality test
Notes: We estimate the causality test with a rolling window of 40 quarters. The left-hand side of the figure presents results of Granger causality
from ΔOILP to ΔGDP ; the right-hand side shows the results of Granger causality from ΔGDP to ΔOILP . Values in dark blue mean that
we can reject the hypothesis of non-causality at 5% significance level and values in yellow mean that we can reject it at 10% significance level,
whereas no color indicates no causality between the variables.
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Figure 6: Rolling estimation of CIR
Note: We estimate the CIRs with a rolling window of 40 quarters. Confidence intervals at 90% of
confidence level.
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 7: IRF of 1875.2-1912.4
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 8: IRF of 1913.1-1941.1
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 9: IRF of 1941.2-1970.3
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Figure 10: IRF of 1970.4-2016.2
Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 11: Posterior means of the standard deviation of residuals
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Figure 12: The five largest downturns and increases of real quarterly oil price
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 13: IRFs to oil price shocks at the time of the five largest increases of oil prices
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 14: IRFs to oil price shocks at the time of the five largest decreases of oil prices
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 15: IRFs of ΔGDP to ΔOILP shocks at the time of the five largest increases of oil prices
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Note: Confidence intervals at 90% of confidence level.
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Figure 16: IRFs of ΔGDP to ΔOILP shocks at the time of the five largest decreases of oil prices
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Figure 17: Comparison of the effects of ΔGDP to ΔOILP shocks at the time of the five largest increases and decreases
of oil prices
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